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Teitelbaum: Children's Rights and the Problem of Equal Respect

CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND THE PROBLEM OF
EQUAL RESPECT
Lee E. Teitelbaum*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Few areas present more difficult problems than does the definition of
the rights of children and parents and the authority of the state regarding
their conduct. Conceptualizations and organizations that serve perfectly
well in talking about other areas of human rights break down swiftly and
badly in this context. The difficulty of applying traditional theory to family relationships led Professor Fried to observe that "[c]ertain moral phenomena are peculiarly elusive,"' and most other writings in the area would

at least implicitly confirm his assessment of the rights of family members.2 American courts, in particular the Supreme Court, have also recognized the complexity presented by the legal position of children and, consequently, have routinely disclaimed any effort to systematically
"consider the impact of... constitutional [guarantees] upon the totality of
the relationship of the minor and the state."'
* Allan R. Tessler Dean and Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. This paper was given
as the 1998 Sidney & Walter Siben Distinguished Professorship Lecture at the Hofstra University
School of Law. The Author is grateful to Siben & Siben Professor John DeWitt Gregory, the faculty, and to the students at Hofstra for the opportunity to present this paper. He also wishes to
thank his colleagues Leslie Francis, Terry Kogan, Mitchel Lasser, Michael McConnell, and Daniel
Greenwood at The University of Utah College of Law for helpful comments on this paper, and
Paul Rudof for his research assistance.
1. CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 150 (1978). This observation was directed more
broadly than the issue under consideration in this Article. The question of the moral justification for
the family's role in unequal distributions of resources to its children, for example, has been a recurring
source of difficulty.
2. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 511 (1971) (discussing the principle of fair opportunity and how the family leads to unequal chances between individuals); MICHAEL WALZER,
SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLUtRAUSM AND THE EQUALrrY 229 (1983) (noting that "[tihe

family is a sphere of special relationships").
3. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (concerning due process rights in juvenile delinquency
proceedings); see Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968) (discussing a New York obscenity
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The question of the rights of children and parents is taken up by a
number of philosophers and legal theoreticians: John Locke, John
Rawls, Bruce Ackerman, David Richards, Gerald Dworkin, and Amy
Gutmann, among them, but usually in connection with responsibility for
education and, in some cases, incompletely. This Article seeks to identify some of the conditions that create the well-recognized problems encountered in analyses of those rights and to explore in some detail one aspect of those problems. The primary focus will be on a set of principles
generally accepted by liberal theories of rights which require (1) that the
fundamental human right is a right to equal respect;4 (2) that to be a rights
holder means that one is entitled to the same respect as every other rights
holder;5 and (3) accordingly, that capacity to claim rights either exists
fully or not at all.6
Although the primary concern of this Article is with legal formulations of rights, those formulations draw on more general moral and social
discourse. Courts do not, and perhaps they should not, formally adopt one
or another moral theory. However, courts cannot avoid thinking in terms
of the principal theories in which they have been educated and which
ground most popular discourse about the rights and entitlements of persons.
Part II of this Article reviews traditional rights discourse in liberal
theory generally, and as applied to children. Part I examines the variety
of legal settings in which children are said to have rights and concludes
that none of those settings recognizes rights in the sense supposed by
traditional rights theory. Part IV suggests that a theory of rights which is
sensible in connection with minors cannot rest on a requirement of equal
respect, and offers a justification for thinking about the rights as a developmental rather than a categorical phenomenon.
This Article is not concerned with developing a theory of rights generally, or with a general critique of liberal theory. There may be points
that are capable of broader application, but this article is concerned only
with liberal rights theory insofar as it applies to discussions of the rights
of children, and at least implicitly grounds the formation of legal doctrines
affecting children's rights.

statute and a minor's First Amendment right to fieedom of expression).
4. See infra notes 7-10.
5. See infra notes 11-18.
6. See infra Part DILB; see also DAVID ARCHARD, CHILDREN: RIGHTS AND CHILDHOOD 82
(1993) (discussing criticisms of rights).
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I.

TRADITIONAL RIGHTS THEORIES AND CHILDREN

For liberal theorists, and often in law, rights are a reflection of a
basic human right to equal respect in making decisions about one's life; a
theory which, it has been argued, the Constitution is meant to express.
This approach begins from the assumption that human beings have a special capacity to reason and engage in deliberative decision-making. They
can evaluate arguments and form plans according to their rational acceptance or rejection of various possibilities.9 It is this capacity in each of us
that is entitled to respect."0
It is further assumed that each of us is entitled not only to respect but
to the same respect due others. The principle of equal respect is variously
articulated according to the context of the moral theory in which it is
situated but it is also associated with the notion of autonomy. Both are
found in Locke's propositions that "all men by nature are equal"" and of
the "equal right,that every man hath, to his naturalfreedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man."'2 H. L. A. Hart
states that "if there are any moral rights at all... there is at least one natural right, the equal right of all men to be free.' 3 This right means that in
the absence of certain conditions any human being capable of choice has
the liberty to undertake any action, which does not coerce, restrain, or aim
to injure others, and has a right to forbearance by all others from the use
of coercion or restraint against him except as necessary to prevent the imposition of coercion or restraint." Ronald Dworkin rests his theory on
principles of human dignity and political equality, such that if some men
have freedom of decision irrespective of the general good, all men must
have the same freedom.' s
Even theories of rights that do not separate claims of rights from the
creation of social good (that is, utilitarian approaches) strongly emphasize
the importance of liberty and the capacity for self-expression.1 6 To take

7. See David A.J. Richards, The Individua=4 The Family, and the Constitution:A Jurisprudential Perspective,55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6,8 (1980).

8. See id. at 8.
9. See iUi
10. See id.at 10.

ed. 1980).
12. Id. The notion of "natural freedom" explains the necessity for some form of contract or consent to justify any exercise of extrinsic (governmental) authority. See id. § 15, at 13.
11. JoHN LocKE, SECONDTREATISE ON GOVERNMENT § 54, at31 (C.B. Macpherson,

13. H. L. A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, in PoLrrCAL PILOSOPHY 53 (Anthony

Quinton ed. 1967).
14. See id.
15. See RONALD DwoPiKm, TAKING RiGHTS SERIOUSLY 198-99 (1977).
16. See JoHN STUARTMaL, ONLBETY, iTTmUTItrrARIANS 484 (Doubleday Books 1973).
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the most familiar instance, Mill, whose views generally follow consequentialist principles, takes as the central purpose of his celebrated essay,
On Liberty, the assertion of
one very simple principle .... That principle is, that the sole end for
which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a
sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear
17
because it will be better for him to do so ....
While so strong a commitment to individual choice is notoriously
difficult to explain within a utilitarian framework, Mill's own position is
that human nature is such that, because of the need for self-expression that
follows upon the capacity for thought and reflection, men and women
simply cannot be made happier by external restrictions on their development and spontaneity.
Several characteristics of these approaches to rights bear emphasis.
Rights based on capacity," or moral agency, 9 or ability to engage in neutral dialogue,' seem ultimately to be understood as categorical. The entitlement to respect is founded on the ability to think rationally, form plans,
and make choices.2 If an individual possesses this capacity or agency, he
or she is entitled to respect for choices about life, and not just to respect in
some degree, but to equal respect that is to the same degree of respect accorded to all other rights holders.2 Absence of this capacity is likewise
categorical, in most views. If a rights holder is entitled to the same respect
as all others, then one either has the same rights as others or has none of
those rights. You may have other rights, if the society decides to give
them to you. Animals are protected from cruelty, infants from starvation;
but neither animals nor infants have rights to self-determination. 23
A second characteristic of the traditional understanding of rights is
its political function. "Rights" have sometimes been described as a militant concept. 24 Standard rights theories based on a respect for the choices

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.at 483-84.
See HOWARD COHEN, EQUAL RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN 38 (1980).
See Richards, supranote 7, at 6-7 (discussing the theories of John Locke).
See BRucEA. ACKERMAN, SOCiALJUSTICEiNTHELiBERALSTATE71 (1980).
See Richards, supranote 7, at 8-9.
See id. at 9.
See ACKERMAN, supra note 21, at 70-75.
See COHEN, supra note 18, at 17; see also DWORKIN, supra note 15, at 198-99
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of others create a "space" around the individual. To have a right to do
something means at least that no one may intrude on your choice except
in very limited circumstances.' In fact, if I am a rights holder or a citizen,
no one else has any general claim regarding my conduct, except when that
conduct invades the space of the other, through coercion or injury. We are
all freestanding, independent actors except to the extent we agree to have
relationships with others.
It is not surprising that these formulations of rights theory find little
place for talk about children. The right to equal respect or to liberty as a
recognition of the special character of mankind's capacity for reason is
only thought appropriate for those who possess the capacity for rational
choice: a criterion commonly held to exclude children.26 Mill's position is
again the most familiar. Immediately after his articulation of the famous
liberty principle, Mill continues:
It is perhaps hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply
only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not
speaking of children ....
Those who are still in a state to require being
taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as
well as against external injury ....Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind has
become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. 27
Locke, likewise, observed that children were an exception to his general proposition that "all men by nature are equal."' The human mind, at
birth, is a "white [p]aper, void of all [c]haracters, without any [i]deas. 29
That paper will be inscribed by experience over time but, because children
lack reason in at least their early years, parents, he said, "have a sort of
rule and jurisdiction over them,"' although temporary and (perhaps) proportionate to the child's level of reason." H. L. A. Hart quite explicitly
observed that the principle of equal right to freedom does not extend to
animals or babies; to do so, in Hart's view, makes an idle use of the expression "a right."32 Bruce Ackerman observes that "[c]hildren are born
(discussing the idea of political equality).
25. See CoHEN, supranote 18, at 19.
26. See ARCHARD, supra note 6, at 7 (discussing the theories of John Locke).
27. MILL, supra note 16, at 484.
28. LoCKE, supranotell,§ 54, at31.
29. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 104 (Peter H. Nidditch
ed., 1975) (emphasis omitted). For a discussion of Locke's theories regarding children, see
ARcHARD, supra note 6, at 1-12.
30. LoCKE, supra note 11, § 55, at31.
31. See id.
32. See Hart,supra note 13, at 57-58.
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radically incomplete"33 Citizenship-Ackerman's version of moral agency
or capacity for independence-is a political and not a biological theory,
and requires a capacity for dialogic performance comprising an understanding that claims to goods or power can be justified only in certain
ways.3 Amy Gutmann observes more simply that "it would be absurd to
apply [the] principle of equal freedom to children." 3
I.

CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN LEGAL DOCTRINE

It will occur to those familiar with Supreme Court doctrine and other
bodies of law dealing with the rights of children that, whatever may be
true for moral theorists, courts and legislatures have been quite ready to
accept children as rights holders. Legislatures have created two kinds of
rights especially applicable to children. All children are entitled to a variety of what might be called "welfare rights," such as to nutrition, food,
shelter, education and the like.36 State laws also provide for statutory
rights, where older children may, even before the age of majority, marry,
secure a driver's license, and seek gainful employment.37 Courts have recognized constitutionally based rights for children in virtually every domain where such rights have been recognized for adults.
Recognition or creation of these various rights for children seems on
its face inconsistent with a general claim that children cannot appropriately be regarded as rights holders. The inconsistency may lie in either of
two directions. It may be that legal doctrines maintain the theoretical notion of rights described above but treat children as possessing the same
rights as adults. 39 Alternatively, legal doctrines may modify the notion of
rights themselves in their application to young persons.4' A review of
these bodies of law dealing with minors suggests that the former hypothesis cannot be supported.
A.

Welfare Rights

The most pervasively recognized rights of children are positive
rights, rights to receive social goods, which find expression in the laws of
33. AcKERMAN, supranote 20, at 139.
34. See id. at 72.
35. Amy Gutmann, Children, Paternalism,and Education:A LiberalArgument, 9 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 338, 338 (1980).
36. See infra Part IILA.
37. See infra PartIILB.
38. See infraPart MlC.
39. See Richards, supra note 7, at 20-23.

40. See id at 23-28.
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every state and in international declarations of human rights. Grants of
positive rights are recognized grudgingly and with some suspicion in connection with adults, but are readily accepted in relation to young people.
We are quite accustomed to talk of the rights of children to education, nutrition, shelter, and other social and personal goods. For example, the
United National Declaration of the Rights of the Child ("United National
Declaration") contains the following principle:
The child is entitled to receive education, which shall be free and compulsory, at least in the elementary stages. He shall be given an education which will promote his general culture, and enable him, on a basis
of equal opportunity, to develop his abilities, his individual judgment,
and his sense of moral and social responsibility, and to become a useful member of society.4'
The right reflected in the United National Declaration, like those to
shelter and nutrition, supposes an obligation on the part of others-parents
or the state-to supply basic social goods.42 It is a positive right in the
sense used by Salmond or Hohfeld: that is, an interest with respect to
which there exists a duty imposed upon some other person, 43 and has often
enough been recognized, although not always enthusiastically, in Supreme
Court decisions."
Recognition of these positive rights can be justified on various theoretical grounds. For social contractarians, they derive from a hypothetical
social contract, as those things that every rational person would consider
essential to have as a child. Even without the contractarian framework, a
liberal may consider some such entitlements to be essential to achieving
the capacity for rational choice on which membership in a liberal society
is founded. Utilitarians can justify a broader range of such rights, as long
as it appears that production of educated healthy children will maximize
human happiness.
Adults have relatively few positive rights. Medicaid would illustrate the exceptional situation.' But even where positive rights are
41.
42.
43.
Wheeler

G.A. Res. 1386, GAOR, 14th Sess., Princ. 7 (1959).
See id.preamble, Princ. 6.
See WEsLEY NEwcorMa HOHFELD, FUNDAMEmrAL LEGAL CONCEPrIONS 36-38 (Walter
Cook ed., 1923); JOHN WLIAM SALMOND, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 261 (Glanville

Williams ed., Ith ed. 1957).
44. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), for example, where the court enforced a right of
access to public schools when such a right was created by state law. See id. at 573-74. More directly,
the Court has also held that the state is obliged to assure that decisions regarding abortion by even
immature minors, and notification of their parents, will serve the child's "best interests.' See Belotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,640 (1979); see Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,75 (1976).
45. See COHEN, supra note 18, at 24.
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available to adults, there is a very important difference between the
posture of positive rights for adults and those rights for children. The
adult holder of positive rights retains his autonomy with respect to those
rights-he or she may take advantage of Medicaid, or may choose not to
do so. By contrast, the United National Declaration does not end with
creation of a governmental duty to provide education. It also presumes a
duty on the child to accept the benefits of that right.46 Education is to be
"compulsory" quite as much as it is to be free.
Claims of this sort, which I have called "integrative rights" elsewhere,47 are evidently based on principles concerning the needs rather than
the preferences or choices of children, at the point at which the decision is
made. A young person's choice to forebear from education, even with
thanks, will not be accorded respect but rather will result in an incorrigibility petition to deprive her of physical liberty. A neglected child does
not have the negative right to decline becoming a ward of the court and
remain in an inadequate home, however dearly she may wish to do so.
There is, in short, no question of equal respect for actual choices in this
sense of rights.
Nor do these integrative rights express the individualism conveyed
by liberty interests. Rights in the latter sense create a social and political
distance between the holder and all others, including the state. Integrative
rights point in precisely the opposite direction. As the United Nations
Declaration itself makes plain, the thrust of the right to education is to become a useful member of the society.48 American juvenile court law has
said exactly the same thing about the coercive intervention of that tribunal: the assumption of jurisdiction over delinquent and neglected children
was explained as an effort by the court to place children on the road to
' when their parents could not or would
"good, sound, adult citizenship"49
°
not do so.
B. Other Statutory Rights for Children
State positive laws also typically recognize certain rights for older
minors that are not based on welfare interests. These laws permit older
46. See G.A. Res., supra note 41, preamble, Princ. 7 (stating that children are "entitled" to an
education).
47. See Lee E. Teitelbaum, Foreword: The Meanings of Rights of Children, 10 N.M. L. REV.
235, 236-42 (1980).
48. See G.A. Res. 1386, GAOR, 14th Sess., Princ. 7 (1959).
49. Julian W. Mack, The ChanceryProcedurein the Juvenile Court, in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC
AND THE COURT 310, 312 (Jane Addams ed., 1925).
50. See id.
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children to engage in activities that are generally permitted for adults and
generally prohibited for minors. It is sometimes argued that these statu-

tory legal entitlements demonstrate that legal rules do not follow the categorical approach to competency supposed by traditional rights theory.
There is, it is said, no single age of majority but rather multiple ages:51
twenty-one for purchase of alcohol;52 eighteen for voting53 and purchasing
tobacco;" sixteen for most kinds of employment,55 for marriage, 6 and eli-

gibility for the death sentence;57 sixteen or even fourteen or fifteen for
permission to drive; 8 and "maturity" for deciding whether to terminate a
pregnancy. 9 These variations in ages of legal capacity are taken to suggest
that "rights" are not all-or-nothing propositions as traditional theory supposes, but rather that legal practice and perhaps legal theory expects that
different rights require different competencies.6
While the argument below will suggest the desirability of considerig competence to be more continuous than categorical, these legislative
distinctions do not demonstrate that such a theory has already been accepted in practice. For one thing, these age limits do not generally reflect
legislative conclusions about the relationship of levels of competence to

51. See, e.g., ARCHARD, supra note 6, at 85; MARTIN R. GARDNER, UNDERSTANDING
JUVENILE LAw 4-5 (1997).
52. See LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 14.09, at 620 (Donald T. Kramer ed., 2d ed. 1994).
The sale of alcohol to persons below the age of 21 is now prohibited in every state, largely because
adoption of a lower drinking age threatens loss of federal highway construction funds. See id.
53. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XXVI, 1.
54. See LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 52, § 14.09, at 623 (noting that a few states
set the minimum legal age for purchasing tobacco at 15 or 16 years).
55. See Andrea Giampetro-Meyer & Timothy S. Brown, ProtectingSociety From Teenage
Greed: A Proposalfor Revising the Ages, Hours and Nature of Child Labor in America, 25
AKRON L. REv. 547, 557 (1992). Most states allow minors at age 16 to work for industrial plants
and/or to work during school hours. "Once a child reaches age 16, federal and state regulators
place few restrictions on their labor." Id. at 558.
56. See generally LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supranote 52, § 14.04, at 592-96 (discussing
restrictions on the legal rights of adolescents with regard to marriage). The minimum age for marrying with parental consent is 16 in most states, and as low as 14 in some states. See id. at 594. For
the rationales of age restrictions on marriage, see Lynn D. Wardle, Rethinking Marital Age Restrictions,22 J. FAM. L. 1 (1983).
57. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (concluding that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the death penalty for children younger than 16 at the time of
their offense); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (finding that the imposition of the
death penalty on offenders who were 16 and 17 at the time of the offense did not violate the
Eighth Amendment).
58. See LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 52, § 14.06, at 601-04.
59. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,72-75 (1976) (striking down
a Missouri statute requiring the consent of a parent or guardian as a condition for an unmarried
minor to obtain an abortion).
60. See ARcHARD, supranote 6, at 85.
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age.6 This is most dramatically true of the age at which people can buy
alcoholic beverages. Many states lowered their drinking ages from
twenty-one to eighteen after the adoption of the Twenty-sixth Amendment
lowering the voting age.62 Currently, the drinking age in all states is
twenty-one as the result of federal legislation requiring that they do so in
order to qualify for highway construction funds.63 The initial reduction in
the drinking age, if it had anything to do with the competence of eighteenyear-olds, arose from their supposed competence to vote rather than to use
alcohol responsibly. The later increase in the drinking age followed not
from a state legislative finding that eighteen-year-olds were after all incompetent to drink responsibly, but from a Congressional decision to that
effect implemented by conditioning eligibility for highway funding on
state acquiescence in that judgment.64 Nor is it clear that either conclusion
would be supported by data about capacity to use alcohol responsibly in
general or even about the specific risk that eighteen-year-olds present a
greater risk in driving vehicles. 5 Studies do show that lowering the
drinking age increased fatalities somewhat among younger drivers. 6
However, they also show that traffic fatalities among persons under
twenty-one were lower than those for young adults between twenty-one
and twenty-five. 67 There was, however, no movement by those who
wished re-election to raise the drinking age to twenty-five."
Even the adoption of the Twenty-sixth Amendment, lowering the age
for voting in federal elections from twenty-one to eighteen, is hard to explain entirely as a judgment about adolescent competence to exercise the
franchise. Although much of the debate took that turn, it has the flavor of
a second-order justification for an essentially political decision that drafting eighteen-year-olds to fight in an unpopular war about which they had
no right to vote was unacceptable or at least unappealing.69

61. Seeidat58-61.
62. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADOLESCENCE 3-4
(1982) (giving the example of Michigan, which lowered its drinking age from 21 to 18 after the
Twenty-sixth Amendment was ratified).
63. See LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 52, § 14.09, at 620.
64. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
65. See ZIMR]NG, supranote 62, at 4-5.
66. See id
67. See id.
68. Cf i at 5-6 (questioning the rationale behind the drinking age and why it was not raised to
25).
69. See WENDELL W. CULTiCE, YouTH's BATrI.E FOR THE BALLOT: A HISTORY OF VOTING
AGE IN AMERICA 234 (1992). Cultice not only emphasizes the power of the rallying cry, "old
enough to fight, old enough to vote," he also emphasizes the need to justify lowering the voting
age by reference to the maturity of 18 year oIds. See id. at 38.
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It is, moreover, important that most of these age-variant laws do not
create rights in the usual adult sense. While a sixteen-year-old may marry
in most states, he or she can only do so with parental permission. 70 By the
same token, a minor seeking a drivers permit typically must have the consent of a parent or guardian. 7' And while a minor may be entitled to decide, or have a court decide, whether termination of a pregnancy is in her
best interests, her parents are entitled to receive notice and must consent
to that procedure unless a court decides that requiring parental notification
or consent would be harmful to the child.72 To vest such authority with
parents obviously contradicts the claim that legislatures have determined
that minors are themselves competent to make decisions about these activities. Rather than create spheres of autonomy for minors, these laws
transfer responsibility for decisions about competence with respect to
these activities from public to private authority-here, the authority of
parents.
It may be suggested that since a seventeen-year-old has more of a
right to marry or drive than a fifteen-year-old, rights are not all-or-nothing
propositions, at least to that extent.73 In one sense, this is true because
older adolescents may be able to do something that is categorically prohibited to their younger siblings. In another sense, however, older adolescents who wish to marry or drive are less subject to a regime of rights than
their younger brothers and sisters. One feature of rights, as we have seen,
is equal respect for choices. All fifteen-year-olds are treated equally by
the law, although they are equally denied the right to marry. However, all
seventeen-year olds are not treated equally. Some seventeen-year-olds
who wish to marry will be allowed to do so by their parents, others will
not. Whether they will be allowed to do so depends entirely on the private
views of their parents rather than any public judgment about capacity.
There is, moreover, no assurance that parents will act in a consistent
fashion regarding that decision or that they will employ any consistent
criterion in making that decision. Most particularly, there is no requirement that parental judgments be made solely on the basis of assessments
of the child's relative maturity. One set of parents may approve of youthful marriages; another may not. A second set of parents may want to encourage the independence that goes with driving a car; another may see
70. See LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, supra note 52, § 14.04, at 594.
71. See id. § 14.06, at 602.
72. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992); see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1990) (upholding the requirement that a minor wait 48 hours after
notifying a single parent before an abortion procedure).
73. See ARCIHARD, supra note 6, at 86.
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only risks of bad associations and dangerous conduct. A third set of parents may not wish or be able to pay the greater insurance premiums that
come with a youthful driver, and a fourth set may want to withhold consent until the child improves her grades or church attendance.
With respect to these decisions and the reasons for them, older minors are subject not to rules of general applicability, but to the personal
domination of their parents. However important and socially acceptable
that domination may be in this setting, a regime in which authority may be
exercised on the basis of the private values and beliefs of the person exercising authority cannot be reconciled with liberal rights theory. To take
only the most familiar example, the vice of vague rules is that they allow
officials an almost unlimited power to grant or deny freedoms, and "the
very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of
living.., at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." 4 Subjection to the "mere will" of another captures, however, the kind of
authority held by parents of minors above some age over decisions to
marry or drive, and for many other purposes as well.
C. Supreme Court Doctrineand Children'sRights
The strongest declarations of minors' rights, and the classes of rights
that seem most indistinguishable from rights in traditional political and
moral theory, are found in decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
The Court has by this point recognized rights claims for children in many
areas where autonomy-based rights have been recognized for adults. The
core meaning of liberty-freedom from physical confinement-was held
applicable to children in In re Gault5 and reaffirmed in Breed v. Jones.6
Gault extended the privilege against self-incrimination to minors, not
solely from concern for untrustworthy confessions but because children
are entitled to decide whether and how they will participate in proceedings
affecting their liberty."
74. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). See generally, Al Katz & Lee E. Teitelbaum, PINS Jurisdiction,the Vagueness Doctrine,and the Rule of Law, 53 IND. L. 1, 1-4 (1977)
(discussing regulation of the "unruly" child).
75. 387 U.S. 1, 27-28,30-31 (1967).
76. 421 U.S. 519 (1975). "[C]omnitment [of a minor to an industrial school] is a deprivation of
liberty. It is incarceration against one's will, whether it is called 'criminal' or 'civil."' Id. at 530
(quoting Inre Gault, 387 U.S. at 50). "Nor does the fact 'that the purpose of the commitment is rehabilitative and not punitive ... change its nature ....
Regardless of the purposes for which the incarceration is imposed, the fact remains that it is incarceration."' Ia at 530 n.12 (quoting Fain v. Duff,
488 F.2d 218,225).
77. See In re Gault,387 U.S. at 47.
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First Amendment rights to political expression have also been recognized for very young children. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
78 for example, held that the suspension of stuCommunity School District,
dents (in that case ages eight, eleven, thirteen, fifteen and sixteen),79 for
wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam War infringed on their right "to
freedom of expression of their views.""0 The right of children to receive
information as well as to express themselves was recognized in Erznoznik
v. City of Jacksonville,1 where the Court held:
Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other
legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the
young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable
for them. In most circumstances, the values protected by the First
Amendment are no less applicable2 when government seeks to control
the flow of information to minors.
Children, of course, have been held to possess some interest in privacy, reflected in rights of access to contraception and abortion.83 The
Court has struck down categorical legislative rules requiring the consent
of a parent of an unmarried minor as a condition to obtaining an abortions'
and prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to minors.85
When claimed by adults, these rights are typically understood as
reflecting values of autonomy and choice. They are "negative rights"-rights not to be controlled by others in our choice about the good life.
Edwin Baker, for example, argues that this view provides the most coherent theory of the First Amendment. "The liberty model holds that the
free speech clause protects not a marketplace but rather an arena of in-

The roots of the privilege [against self-incrimination] ... tap the basic stream of religious and political principle because the privilege reflects the limits of the individual's
attornment to the state and-in a philosophical sense-insists upon the equality of the
individual and the state .... One of its purposes is to prevent the state, whether by
force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person
under investigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide whether to assist the
state in securing his conviction.
IL
78. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
79. See id. at 504, 516.
80.
L at 511.
81. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
82. Id. at213-14.
83. See Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (upholding a minor's right of
access to contraceptives); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (upholding a minor's
right of access to abortion).
84. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,643 (1979); Danforth,428 U.S. at 72-75.
85. See Carey,431 U.S. at 694.
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dividual liberty from certain types of governmental restrictions. Speech
is protected not as a means to a collective good but because of the value
of speech conduct to the individual." 6
Reproductive rights are, perhaps even more clearly, founded on recognition of the value of choice.
"Although '[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right
of privacy,' the Court has recognized that one aspect of the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is 'a right
87
of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy.'
The "right of personal privacy includes 'the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions.' 88 The decision over
whether or not to have a child is "at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices."89 Further, "[i]f the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free of
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.""
The privilege against self-incrimination, in the adult context, also can
be understood in terms of a zone of autonomy. The privilege is not solely
or even primarily concerned with the accuracy of statements by those
facing criminal prosecution, but rather with assuring that suspects may
freely decide whether to cooperate in a proceeding affecting their liberty.91
The above cases do seem to suggest that children are generally entitled to rights in the strong sense enjoyed by adults: to claims of selfdetermination and self-realization against all others, including the state.
But how can the Supreme Court have held that children have autonomybased rights in the midst of a legal setting that supposes that children are
obliged to accept parental and governmental control regarding health,
education, housing, and the like? Part of the answer to this dilemma is
that, although rights to speech, procreation and the like are justified for
adults in terms of their capacity for rational choice, the extension of these

86. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the FirstAmendment Freedomof Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rsv. 964,
966 (1978); see also THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970)
(discussing the values and functions of a system of freedom of expression in a democratic society);
Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 215-22 (1972)
(defending "the Millian Principle by showing it to be a consequence of the view that the powers of a
state am limited to those that citizens could recognize while still regarding themselves as equal,
autonomous, rational agents").
87. Carey, 431 U.S. at 684 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)).

88. IdL (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,599-600 (1977)).
89. I at 685.
90. Id. (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972)).
91. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,55-56 (1964).
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rights to minors has never been explained on grounds assuming the same

capacity for choice.
In fact, discussion of the competence of children rarely appears in
decisions extending procedural protection in delinquency cases,. or even
in decisions regarding privacy and First Amendment interests claimed by
or on behalf of children. The Court has, on the one hand, recognized that
minors enjoy some degree of liberty interest in virtually all areas where
such interests are recognized for adults.93 On the other hand, these liberty
interests have not usually been explained on grounds of adult-like capac-

ity for choice.
Rather, the Court's analysis has begun textually with the observation

that the Constitution talks of "persons."' It has followed that minors have
some claims arising from the due process clause, but not that the extent of
state power to regulate is the same for minors and adults, as would be true
on an assumption of equal capacity. 5 On the contrary, the Court has long
recognized greater governmental authority to regulate the activities of mi-

nors than would be allowable for adults.96 States may restrict religiously

motivated activities of children when some danger exists,79 although
adults probably could not be so controlled. They may require attendance
at school by minors,9" and may limit minors' access to "objectionable" but

not "obscene" material that could not constitutionally be kept from
adults. 99
The greater authority of the state to regulate the decisions and conduct of minors reflects precisely the belief that adjudication of their

claims to rights does not entail assumptions about equal capacity. Justice
92. Neither In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970), requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, nor Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975), holding that the prohibition against double jeopardy extended to delinquency adjudications, were framed in terms of the competence of children, focusing rather on the consequences of adjudication for them.
93. See, e.g., Carey 431 U.S. at 693 (upholding the right of access to contraceptives); Planned
Parenthood. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 102 (1976) (dealing with the termination of a fetus); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (dealing with Fst Amendment rights); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 653 (1977) (concerning the use of corporal punishment and a student's right to physical integrity).
94. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at51l.
95. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at74-75.
96. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S.158, 170 (1944) "[T]he power of the state to control
the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults ....Id.
97. See id.
at 170-71.
98. This proposition has routinely been assumed. See, e.g. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
213 (1972) (acknowledging that a State has the power "to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) ("the
State can require all children of proper age to attend some school").
99. See Ginsberg v.New York, 390 U.S. 629,634,636 (1968).
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Stewart, concurring in Ginsberg v. New York, justifies protecting children
from non-obscene publications in the following way:
I think a State may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a captive audienceis not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the
presupposition of First Amendment guarantees. It is only upon such a
premise, I should suppose, that a State may deprive children of other
rights-the right to marry, for example, or the right to votedeprivations that would be constitutionally intolerable for adults.'00
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Carey v. Population Services
International"' sounded the same theme. The privacy interest implicated
(access to contraceptives) was at base an "interest in ...making certain
kinds of important decisions,"' ' 2 and "the law has generally regarded minors as having a lesser capability for making important decisions."" This
assumption is reflected as well in the standard of review employed by
Justice Brennan in connection with privacy rights of minors. The issue is
whether state restrictions "serve 'any significant state interest ... that is
not present in the case of an adult,""' a test he characterizes as: "[1]ess
rigorous than the "compelling state interest" test applied to restrictions
on the privacy rights of adults. Such lesser scrutiny is appropriate ...
because of the States' greater latitude to regulate the conduct of children." 0 5
Constitutional doctrine--even when it upholds children's rights that
are founded on the principle of equal respect when recognized for
adults-does not assume that children are as capable of mature choice or
that they possess the same "negative rights," rights to be left alone, as do
adults.
Supreme Court decisions do not make a great deal of this modification in the theory of rights for children." 6 Since all rights are subject to
regulation in some circumstances, it seems to follow easily that the rights
of children can be regulated according to the abilities of their holders. In
principle, however, there is more to it than that. We have already seen that
rights in the adult setting are universal in scope. Your right to speech and

100. Id.
at 649-50 (footnote omitted).
101. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
102. Id.at 693 n.15 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,599-600 (1977)).
103. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S., 52, 102) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
104. Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,75 (1976)).
105. Id. at 693, n.15 (citations omitted).
106. See supranotes 76-105 and accompanying text.
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my right to speech are identical; your privilege against self-incrimination
and mine are formally identical. For some persons to have broader rights
than others would be an unacceptable denial of the principle of equal respect. A regulation limiting speech where there is an immediate risk of
violence must apply to all instances of such risk, which means that all
speakers are subject to an identical range of limitation. The thrust of the
Supreme Court cases discussed above, however, is precisely to say that
the rights of children are more limited in their extension than those of
adults. Whatever their status as rights, children's rights are understood
differently than are the rights of adults.
IV. RETHINKING RESPECT FOR CHILDREN
A. Are Equal Respect and Children'sRights Compatible?
Even though children are said to have legal rights of at least three
kinds, none reflects the understanding of rights developed for adults in
liberal political and moral theory. Welfare or positive rights for adults
may be predicated on hypothetical choices in the sense that they are
justified by the belief that all reasonable persons would wish to have
those social goods available. However, the provision of those goods to
adults ultimately depends on their actual choices as well; presumably,
competent adults are free to decline them if they choose. Children are
not free to do so; their actual choices regarding positive rights are not
entitled to respect.
Special statutory rights, such as rights to marry or drive, likewise
do not reflect respect for choices by minors. These laws may permit minors access to these privileges, and in most families the realization of
those opportunities are negotiated between parents and children."'0
However, the formal structure of special statutory rights respects
choices by parents or guardians on behalf of minors rather than choices
by the minors themselves.
Even constitutionally based rights, such as freedom of access to information or to express oneself, or to decide on childbearing, do not
embody the same notion of respect that they reflect when applied to
adults. The Supreme Court has made clear that the scope and implementation of these rights for children may be conditioned in ways that they

107. See supraPartII.
108. I am grateful to Mitchel Lasser for reminding me of the functional aspect of these special
rights.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1999

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:799

could not be limited for adults precisely because children lack experience and judgment.'O Limitations of these kinds cannot be reconciled
with the equal respect to which choices by adults are entitled.
Plainly, the extension of "rights" to children does not mean that
law treats children as if they were adults. Would it then be right to say
that legal doctrine as it applies to children reflects a different understanding of rights, or alternately that legal doctrine is really not talking
about rights at all, but rather about a regulatory scheme that borrows the
language of rights?
The difficulty with the latter explanation is that all three bodies of
law establish claims to which the language of rights seems appropriate.
As we have seen, positive rights are thought of as rights in Salmond's
and Hohfeld's sense of claims upon others to carry out some publicly
established duties."' Special statutory rights do recognize circumstances
under which older children may marry or drive."' Constitutional rights
do, under some circumstances, allow minors to resist incarceration and
personal intrusions
and to express themselves or decide to terminate a
2
pregnancy."
It is those circumstances that are special in the case of children and
for which standard liberal rights theory makes no place. The question
becomes, is it possible to create a rights theory that makes sense for minors and maintains the principle of equal respect?
One approach, already examined to some extent, would understand
rights of children in the same way as we understand rights of adults, but
modify our notion of minority by varying the ages at which they are
recognized."' In this approach, competence is variable across activities,
but all rights holders reaching a certain age will be entitled to equal respect for their decisions within particular domains. It has sometimes
been suggested, as we have seen, that this approach has been taken with
respect to, for example, capacity to marry, obtain a driving license, or
terminate a pregnancy.1 4 However, as we have also seen, those bodies
of law do not incorporate a principle of equal respect for the decisions
of minors as they reach varying ages but rather transfer authority for
these decisions from public to private (parental) authority.

109.
110.
111.
112.

See supranotes 96-101 and accompanying text.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 71, 74.
See supraPart IC.
113. See ARCtARD, supra note 6, at 85.

114. See id.
115.

See supra notes 52-75 and accompanying text.
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The fact that we have not adopted a domain-specific notion of
competence does not mean that we could not do so. The project is not,
however, a simple one if it is indeed attainable. It requires that we come
to some understanding of the meaning of competence for a particular
purpose that can be related specifically and categorically to age. A general understanding of competence in that domain will not suffice. If all
persons of the threshold age are to receive equal respect for their decisions (to marry, choose medical care, or the like), we must be confident
that virtually all persons of that age can and will make decisions meeting that understanding of competence.
One could also maintain the notion of equal respect but vary the
point at which the entitlement attaches on a less categorical basis-that
is, through a process of factual determination of competence. All minors
found competent to make a particular kind of decision thereby acquire
an entitlement to equal respect with respect to decisions of that kind."6
Several observations might be made about individualized decisions
to determine a child's stage of development. One is that individualization does not allow persons to plan in advance, as we suppose citizens
or rights holders to do. Their plans must be contingent on the result of
some process: a contingency that, I suggested earlier, is difficult to reconcile with our general scheme of rights. A second, somewhat related
aspect of this strategy is that the basis for finding a child competent may
turn on his or her agreement with some external standard for "good"
judgment. Those occasions where adults say that a child's choice of
goals and perception of social reality regarding his or her accomplishments are "mature" or "sensible" may occur where the child's views
coincide with the adults, those occasions where adults conclude that a
child has not proved capable of mature and sensible choices of goals
and means arise when the child's choices depart from the adult's own
views."' John Eekelaar provides this illustration, where a judge agreed

116. This may seem to be the approach taken by the Supreme Court with respect to procreafive decisions and by states which allow "mature minors" to decide on medical care. However, as
we observed earlier, the Supreme Court's decisions regarding procreation do not in fact recognize
equal liberty interests even for "mature minors" in general. Unlike anyone else, including the
spouse of a pregnant woman, a minor's right to choose an abortion may constitutionally be conditioned on notice to and consent by her parents except when the minor demonstrates in a judicial
proceeding that notice and consent would be harmful to her. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 895, 899 (1992).
117. See JOHN EEKELkAR, THE INTERESTS OF THE CHILD AND THE CHILD'S WISHES: THE
ROLE OF DYNAMIC SELF-DETERMINISM, in THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: RECONCILING
CULTURE AND HuMAN RIGHTS 42,55-56 (Philip Alston, ed. 1994).
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with a nine-year-old girl's preference not to live in France with her
mother:
It seems to me that the view she has put forward, looking at the whole
circumstances of her life, is a mature and rational view, which seems
to be based on genuine and cogent reasons. I would go further and say
that I think it is probably in her best interests ... in deciding whether
the views are mature, if they coincide with what seems to me to be the
best interests of the child, I am entitled to take that into account in assessing her maturity."
This strategy plainly fails to carry out its aim of maintaining the
principle of equal respect insofar as it makes agreement with an external
standard the measure of capacity to choose.
Moreover, individualized assessments of development entail considerable transaction costs, even if we can identify some satisfactory
notion of competence that is independent of generally-prevailing adult
views of the good life. The intellectual and moral development of each
minor, and perhaps his or her resistance to impulse and ability to conform behavior to knowledge, must be established through proof and
measured against the standard(s) applicable to the domain in question.
Ultimately, neither strategy for maintaining the principle of equal
respect in connection with children seems feasible. In addition, and perhaps more important, neither takes account of the child's relationship to
others, and especially to his or her parents. That failure seems inevitable
if we seek to maintain the basic structure of liberal rights theory. Standard
rights theories create a "space" around the individual. The right to equal
respect means that no one is entitled to control an individual's choices on
the ground that it would be in the general interest to do so or that the individual himself or herself is less worthy than others. To have a right to do
something means at least that no one may intrude on your choices. As a
result, no one else has any general claim regarding your conduct, except
when that conduct invades the space of the other, through coercion or injury. Relationships that may create limitations on decisions arise only
from hypothetical or actual agreements or from conduct.
This may or may not make sense for adults. But whatever may be
true for adults, it does not seem to work when we are talking about parents and children. Unlike the term "individual," the term child does not
stand alone from all others, but necessarily implies parents. One does
not use the word "child" without having parents in mind. Even the

118.

S v. S (child abduction), [1992] 2FLR 31, quoted in Eekelaar, supra note 117, at 56.
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phrase "parentless child" makes clear that thinking about children is in
some way incomplete without reference to parents." 9
A theory of fights that ignores parents is similarly incomplete
without some attention to the general claims that parents may make with
respect to the ways in which their children develop. Those rights may be
said to belong to the parents themselves or to derive from rights held by
their children.'O The choice of theory may make some difference in how
we think about the rights of children, and on any theory, parents have
considerable responsibility for influencing their choices and assessing
their capacity for choice. Accordingly, the relationship between the
claims of parents and those of children must be taken into account in
talking about the rights of children and that may, as well, require rethinking of the premises of traditional rights theory."'
B. The Possibilityof Differential Respect
Perhaps, then, we should inquire into the possibility of a theory of
rights that does not depend on the principle of equal respect. As we have
seen, this principle means that fights must be universal in their extension. And if rights are universal in their extension in the sense that all
those who qualify as fights holders have the same rights claims as all
others, the capacity to have fights must be categorical. If one is competent, then one is fully competent; if one is incompetent, then one is not
competent at all.
This understanding of competence may be sensible when applied to
adults. Above a certain, not very high, level of intelligence, we may be
comfortable in saying that all persons-whether they be more or less intelligent, or sophisticated or experienced-are equal." Adulthood is considered an achieved state that is largely defined by its contrary; that is,
adulthood is when childhood is left behind." Whether we are comfortable
or not in treating virtually all adults as equally capable, liberal theory vir119. I am indebted to Jim Ellis at the University of New Mexico Law School for this observation.
120. See ARCHARD, supra note 6, at 97-109; see also Gutmann, supra note 35, at 348
(discussing the competing rights of parents and children and the balancing of their interests).
121. For an argument against thinking of the situation of the fetus without considering the
circumstances of parents, see Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Beyond Divorkin'sDominions: Investments,
Memberships, The Tree of Life, and the Abortion Question, 72 TEx. L. REv. 559, 598-601 (1994).
122. Ackerman is quite clear about the limited requirements for what he calls citizenship. His
theory of citizenship-the basis for claims to respect-requires only "a thin thread of mutual intelligibility" not great mental acuity or great loquacity. See ACKERMAN, supra note 20, at 75. Indeed, a five-year-old may have at least an initial claim of this sort. See id. at 146-47.
123. See ARCHAR, supra note 6, at 36.
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tually requires that we act as if we are. If the fundamental right of citizens
of a liberal state is to equal respect for their choices about a good life, requiring a high level of capacity would, in the first place, deny citizenship
to many persons-indeed, it would create an aristocracy of intelligentsia
that would offend liberal principles. Even if the necessary level of capacity were not very high, the fact that it could routinely be contested would
deny citizens the assurance of respect assumed by liberal theory.
However, this simplifying strategy does not capture what we know,
and what we think, about children. We may, it is true, talk about childhood as a "stage" as we talk about adulthood as a stage. At the same time,
we recognize that children are an inescapably differentiated group with
respect to their capacity for choice. Infants cannot feed themselves, much
less engage in cognitive or moral reasoning. Nor, we believe, can they
control their sense of need or desire sufficiently to act according to what
reasoning would suggest the right course of action to be. In short, infants
present the classic case for paternalism. They can appropriately be forbidden to eat dirt or play in the streets. Even the most committed advocates
of children's rights concede the incapacity of babies and infants to exercise choice.' 4
Beyond infancy, however, the question of competence and the extent
to which their choices should be controlled becomes complicated. As
children grow, they develop-at differing rates-various aspects of the
capacity for choice. One body of research on cognitive development suggests that even quite young children (by age four or five) can engage in
what appears to be causal reasoning.' Research concerning consent to
treatment indicates that elementary school age children can identify the
risks of therapy and children in the intermediate grades make "adult-like"
decisions about routine therapeutic and educational questions, even if they
are less able than adults to evaluate the risks and benefits associated with
treatments.'26 Research on moral reasoning also suggests that very young
children are capable of sociocentric, rather than egocentric, reasoning and
behavior, and that even preschoolers have some notion of the difference
between intentional and unintentional conduct 7 The political implications of this literature may be found in Professor Ackerman's conclusion
that a five year old who asks something like "Parent, why are you entitled
to boss me around?" is raising the question of legitimate authority and ac124. See, e.g., RIcHARDFARSON, BIRTmRGHTs 172, 185 (1974).
125. See Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward a New Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L.
REV. 146, 155 (1989).
126. See id. at 153-54.
127. See id. at 154.
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cordingly taking the essential first step to dialogic competence and citizenship.'2
At first glance, it is sobering to realize that behavior by a five-yearold which Professor Ackerman celebrates in terms of citizenship would
lead most of us to send the emerging citizen to her room. On second
thought, however, we do think differently of and act differently toward
even five-year-olds than we do of babies. Five-year-olds are capable of
communication and of reasoning to some degree, which produce a far
different interactive relationship between child and parent. These differences become even more pronounced as the child's experience, knowledge, and capacity for judgment increase.
These differences in how we think about children, moreover, carry
normative significance in our society. At early stages, the relationship
between parents and children is one of control, mediated by affection.
This stage of intensely personal authority is so generally true that we
can indeed regard that quality as universal, or nearly so. There is no
conflict between spheres of personal autonomy, and limits on parental
authority can only be justified to the extent that their conduct harms
others; here, their children.
As the child grows older, however, the value of parental control
weakens, as it confronts a conflicting value. Children must not only be
kept safe and socialized to accept authority, but they must also develop a
capacity for autonomous action within existing norms. A child who does
not learn to make choices within our cultural framework is plainly unable
to perform the adult role in society. Indeed, the emphasis on acceptance of
authority that is valued during infancy gives way to a normative expectation that children will assert some degree of autonomy as they move
through adolescence. 9 Thus, a child who fails to assert that autonomy
may be described as "tied to his mother's apron strings." That description
is pejorative, and the criticism it conveys is directed to both the child and
his or her parent.
C. Justificationsfor Differential Respect
The problem with founding rights on a principle of equal respect is
that doing so fails to give normative significance to differences in capacity
or to partial capacity that we recognize and to which we attach social significance. Here, at least, rights theory is inconsistent with what we under-

128. See ACKERAN, supra note 20, at 147.
129. See Katz & Teitelbaum, supra note 75, at 17-18.
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stand about the psychological and moral development of children and
with what we expect of children and their guardians.
Such an inconsistency is surely at odds with the importance we ordinarily attach to beliefs about psychological and moral capacity in political
and moral theory. Indeed, psychological convictions routinely ground
rights talk. Theories of rights routinely appeal to "human nature"-and
human nature is routinely employed as a summary term for what we believe about our intellectual and moral capacities. When Mill says that human nature is such that men will usually not be made happier by even benevolently intended external constraints on their behavior, 3 ' he appeals to
psychology. And it is absence of intellectual capacity that excludes children and young persons from claims to the liberty principle. For Locke as
well, as we have seen, it is the exercise of reason that qualifies an individual for the exercise of freedom.' And, at least in connection with paternal
education if not political authority, Locke seems to believe that the capacity to reason is a continuous rather than categorical phenomenon and that
a parent's exercise of power over a child's freedom should 2be proportionate to the degree of the child's development of experience.'
Justification for taking account of the developmental nature of capacity in formulating a rights theory can be found in a variety of more
modem sources as well. Roscoe Pound, for example, suggested that law
should reflect the "received ideals" of the "time and place."'' The same
sense is expressed by the notion that legal doctrines should embody, as a4
matter of prudence or legitimacy, the moral sense of the community. 1
The moral sense of the community surely includes recognition that parental authority varies by their children's stage of development. One of the
few empirical studies of community attitudes found that those attitudes,
unlike legal rules insisting on undifferentiated parental responsibility for
children, recognized the importance of choice by adolescents.' Most particularly, the respondents in that study disapproved plenary parental con-

130. See MILL, supra note 16.
131. SeeLOcKE, supra note 11, § 54, at31.
132. See John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, in THE EDUCATIONAL
WRITINGS OFJOHN LOCKE § 41, at 145-46 (James L. Axtell ed. 1968).
133. See ROSCOE POUND, LAWAND MORALS 113 (1924).
134. See JULIUs COHEN Er AL., PARENTAL AUTHORITY: THE COMMUNITY AND THE LAW 3-5
(1958) (citing Herman U. Kantorowicz & Edwin Patterson, Legal Science: A Summary of It's
Methodology, 28 CoLUM. L. REV. 679, 696 (1928)); Morris R. Cohen, Jus NaturaleRedivivum, 25
PHIL.REV. 761,766 (1916).
135. See Cohen et al., supra note 134, at 194.
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John Rawls explicitly incorporates beliefs about psychology, and
particularly developmental psychology, in his approach to justice.'37 A
well-ordered society, in his view, is one in which everyone accepts and
knows that the others accept the same principles of justice. These principles must be relatively stable, in order to appeal to persons choosing those
over other competing principles. And, he argues, the stability of a notion
of justice depends on the extent to which it is consistent with human psychology, expressed as moral sentiments.3 Professor Rawls finds his theory of justice as fairness supported by standard views of moral development, according to which children move from an early morality of
authority founded on their perception of their parents' love and support
for their development to progressively higher levels of judgment: a development consistent with a dynamic view of the rights and relationships of
children and parents.'39
The importance of this description of moral development, for Professor Rawls, lies in establishing the fit between basic human psychology
and moral theory, on the assumption that persons will choose a moral theory that is consistent with their basic social nature.' 4° Its importance for us
is more limited, but nonetheless substantial. If the justification for recognizing certain rights rests on what we know or believe about the course of
moral development, it is appropriate for legal institutions to take account
of the nature of development in determining the claims of children and
those of parents, rather than ignoring that development
in favor of di14
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choice.
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V.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this Article has been only to explore one aspect of the
problems encountered in employing traditional rights talk in connection
136. See id.at3-4.
137. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 453-58.
138. See id.
139. See i.
140. See id.at 460.
141. The relevance of a developmental view of moral choice does not depend on any particular
taxonomy of the stages of that development To take only the best known alternate scheme, Professor
Carol Gilligan's view is equally developmental, although she suggests that women tend to emphasize
a relational rather than a hierarchical understanding of rights and interests. See CAROL GInLGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VoICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN's DEVELOPMENT 62-63 (1982). Indeed,
her argument assumes precisely the importance of a fit between basic human psychological orientation
and moral theory, although she differs from Professor Rawls in the theory she supports.
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with minors. As it turns out, that discussion suggests that the Supreme
Court has been wise to defer consideration of the complete relationship
between children and the state if that consideration were to rely on the
ordinary requirements of rights talk. And it may be that the approach actually taken by the Court is justifiable despite its departure from the requirements of traditional rights theory. The Court's decisions do not assume that children are equal among themselves; some are capable
themselves of making decisions to terminate their pregnancies and others
are not. Nor are minors equal to adults; it is appropriate to take account of
circumstances that are special to young people when doing so can be
shown to be justified. But despite these inequalities within the class of
minors and between minors and adults, it is nonetheless important to talk
about rights if we are to show some appropriate level of respect for members of the community who have some, if not complete, capacity to reason
and some, if not complete, capacity to engage in moral activity.
This takes us only part of the way, however. It is a useful first step
to consider one of the ways in which developing an approach to rights
that applies sensibly to children will require reconsideration of traditional rights theory itself. A revised theory will require a diminished
emphasis on universality, greater specificity with respect to the relationship between rights and social institutions, and reconsideration of our
understanding of parents' rights, among other things. But these are subjects for another day.
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